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D ISCUSSIONS OF GOVERNMENT regulation of product hazards, such as toxic substances, frequently conclude that decision makers would be aided by the results of ben-
efit-cost studies and related economic analyses.1 This article tries 
to explain the role of such quantitative analyses in the regulatory 
process. 
The motive for incorporating benefit-cost analysis into public de-
cision making is to lead to a more efficient allocation of government 
resources by subjecting the public sector to the same type of quan-
titative constraints as those in the private sector. In making an 
investment decision, for example, business executives compare the 
costs to be incurred with the expected revenues. If the costs ex-
ceed the revenues, the investment usually is not consideFed worth-
while. If revenues exceed costs, further consideration usually is 
given the proposal, although capital constraints require another 
determination of the most financially attractive investments. 
The government agency decision maker, however, does not face 
the same type of economic constraints. If the costs and other dis-
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advantages to society of an agency action exceed the benefits and 
other advantages, that situation may not have an in1mediate ad-
verse impact on the agency. However, such an action would have 
an hnmediate impact on a private business if one of its executives 
1nade an error. Such analytical information rarely exists in the 
public sector, so that, more often than not, the govenunental de-
cision n1aker is not aware that he or she is approving a regulation 
that is economically inefficient. The ain1 of requiring agencies to 
perfonn benefit-cost analysis is to make the governn1ent' s decision-
n1aking process more effective, and to elhninate regulatory actions 
that, on balance, generate n1ore costs than benefits. This result 
is not assured by benefit-cost analysis, since political and other 
in1portant, but subjective, considerations may dominate. This n1ay 
result in actions that are not economically efficient, but are de-
sired on grounds of equity or income distribution. Yet benefit-
cost analysis may provide valuable information for governn1ent 
decision makers. 
The Economic Rationale 
It may be useful to consider the economic rationale for making 
benefit-cost analyses of government actions. Economists have long 
been interested in identifying policies that promote economic wel-
fare, specifically by in1proving the efficiency with which a society 
uses its resources. 2 
Benefits are measured in terms of the increased production of 
goods and services. Costs are computed in terms of the foregone 
benefits that would have been obtained by using those resources 
in some other activity. The underlying aim of benefit-cost analysis 
is to maximize the value of the social income, usually measured 
by the gross national product (GNP). For many years, certain fed-
eral agencies (such as the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of 
Reclamation) have used benefit-cost analysis to evaluate prospec-
tive projects. 
Despite important operational difficulties, including that of choos-
ing an appropriate discount rate, which would correspond to a 
realistic estimate of the social cost of capital, these analyses have 
helped to in1prove the allocation of government resources. They 
have served as a partial screening device to eliminate uneconomical 
projects-those for which prospective gains are clearly less than 
2 
estimated costs. The analyses also have provided some basis for 
ranking and comparing projects and choosing among alternatives. 
Perhaps the overriding value of benefit-cost analysis has been to 
demonstrate the in1portance of making relatively objective eco-
nomic evaluations of political actions and to narrow the area in 
which subjective factors dominate. Thus, if economically ineffi-
cient programs are approved, at least government decision makers 
know the price being paid for those actions. 3 
Applying Analysis to Regulation 
Figure 1 shows the basic relationship of costs and benefits that 
tends to hold for n1ost regulatory programs. Typically, the initial 
regulatory effort-such as cleaning up the worst effects of pollu-
tion in a river-may well generate benefits greater than costs. But 
the resources required to achieve additional cleanup become dis-
proportionately high, and at some point the added benefits may 
be substantially less than the added costs. For example, a study 
of the impact of environmental controls on the fruit and vege-
table processing industry revealed that it costs less to eliminate 
the first 85 percent of the pollution than the next 10 percent. 4 In 
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logical oxygen demand (BOD) -a n1easure of the oxygen required 
to deeompose organic wastes-up to a level where 30 percent of 
pollution is eliminated. But it costs an additional $20 for a one-
pound reduction at the 65 percent control level and an additional 
$60 for a one-pound reduction when over 95 percent control is 
achieved.5 
Another comparison is equally telling. The pulp and paper in-
dustry spent $3 billion between 1970 and 1978 complying with 
federal clean-water standards, and achieved a 95 percent reduc-
tion in pollution. But to reach the new reduction goal proposed 
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)-98 percent by 1984 
-would cost $4.8 billion more, a 160 percent increase in costs to 
achieve a 3 percent improvement in water quality. Thus, it is 
important to look beyond the relationship of the costs and the 
benefits of a proposed governmental undertaking to the addi-
tional (marginal) benefits and costs resulting from each extension 
of or addition to the governmental activities. 
If regulatory activity goes unchecked, the result could be an 
excess of costs over benefits. Thus, benefit-cost analyses should 
be viewed as a tool for identifying the optimum amount of regu-
lation, rather than as a means of debating the pros and cons of 
regulation in general. To an economist, "overregulation" is not 
an emotional term; it is merely shorthand for the regulatory ac. 
tivities in which th~ costs to the public are greater than the benefits. 
When there is more than one alternative for attaining a regu-
latory goal, benefit-cost analysis can be used to compare the var-
ious methods and to help select the most attractive. Consider the 
following hypothetical example: Suppose a government agency 
wishes to control the amount of pollutants a factory is spilling 
into a river. Assume technology allows for two means of reducing 
the pollution, System A and System B, of which System B is costlier, 
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Systen1 B has greater benefits per dollar spent than Syste1n A 
(i.e., a benefit-cost ratio of 1.38 compared with 1.25). Although 
System B has a larger annual cost than System A, System B will 
yield the greater benefit to society. In the creation of government 
policy, however, such simple cases are rarely encountered. 
If a business decision in the private sector places an external 
burden on its neighbors, such as pollution, the firm does not in-
clude such a cost in its accounting, since it does not bear the 
burden. Public sector decision makers, however, must, or at least 
ought to, consider all the effects of such a decision. Because their 
vantage point is the entire nation, government regulators-unlike 
their private sector counterparts-should attempt to include all 
costs and benefits, including those external to the government. 
The agencies should do so because most regulatory actions have 
indirect effects on the economy. For example, requiring safety belts 
in autmnobiles has a direct in1pact on the cost of automobiles and 
on sales in the safety belt industry. It also influences the severity 
of auto accidents and has a ripple effect on the suppliers of the 
safety belt industry and their suppliers, and so on. If a regulatory 
decision is to be good, these indirect effects, as well as the direct 
impacts, must be taken into account. 
Quantification 
The benefits and costs attributable to regulation are measured 
by the difference between the benefits and costs that occur in the 
presence of regulation and those that would prevail in its absence. 
Although the idea may seem straightforward, its application can 
be complex. Determining what would occur in the absence of regu-
lation-which establishes a reference point for the calculations-
may involve a considerable amount of judgment. 
Table 2 shows how the incremental costs (the expenses that 
would not have been made in the absence of regulation) were 
computed in one study of water pollution control. Apparently the 
bulk of the costs would have been undertaken voluntarily. 
Sometimes the indirect effects of regulation may be as important 
as the direct. Consider, for example, the question of mandatory 
standards to ensure the production of less hazardous consumer 
products. From time to time, suggestions have been made to re-
quire more protection in helmets and other recreational equipment 
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Table 2 
Calculation of Incremental Cost of Regulation 
Steps 
Company identifies an action taken to 
comply with a specific regulation. 
Would action have , been taken other-
wise? 
What was the cost of the action? 
How much would the action that 
would have been taken in the absence 
of regulation have cost? 
What was the incremental cost? 
Example 
Installation of waste-water pretreat-
ment system to remove 99 percent of 
pollutants in compliance with Title 
40 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, Chapter 1, Part 128. 
Pretreatment system without Title 40 
would have been designed to remove 
95 percent of pollutants. 
$1,200,000 (from fixed-asset ledger 
data). 
$800,000 (the cost of installing a 95 
percent system) . 
$1,200,000 - $800,000 = $400,000. 
Source: Regulation, July/August, 1979, p. 21. 
used in playing football. Those using the safer helmets would be 
expected to receive the benefit of fewer or less severe injuries. 
However, such a safety standard could impose substantial costs 
on lower-income youngsters. Perhaps of greater concern, the stan-
dards might even contribute to more injuries since the price in-
creases might result in more people playing football without any 
protective equipment at all. That example illustrates another basic 
thrust of benefit-cost analysis-to examine the proposed government 
action not only from the viewpoint of the impact on the business 
firm but also from the vantage point of the effects on the consumer. 
A large, but difficult to measure, type of regulatory cost is a 
grouping that economists refer to as dead-weight losses. Regulation 
often limits the range of permissible prices, practices, or processes. 
Those legal restrictions may inhibit the most productive use of 
resources. The loss of the higher output that would result in the 
absence of the regulatory activity-those dead-weight losses-arises 
from an inefficient combination of factors. For example, the total 
efficiency of the economy is reduced when regulated surface trans-
portation rates make it necessary for freight to be moved by rail 
rather than hauled at a lower cost by truck. 0 That is so because 
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more resources are being used to achieve the same objective. 
When political judgment suggests that it is not feasible to put 
a dollar sign on the benefits, a benefit-cost analysis still can be 
helpful by ranking the cost-effectiveness of alternatives. By using 
this method, which was originally developed for military programs, 
estimates are made of the costs of different ways to accomplish an 
objective. Cost-effectiveness analyses permit policymakers to iden-
tify least-cost solutions. In this more limited approach, the analyst 
assumes that the objective is worth accomplishing. In the regu-
latory field, this approach may be particularly useful in dealing 
with programs to reduce personal hazards. Instead of dealing with 
such an imponderable question as the cost of a hun1an life, the 
emphasis shifts to identifying regulatory approaches that would 
maximize the number of lives saved after use of certain resources 
(such as people or capital), or minimize pain. Rather than a cold 
systems approach, such attempts at objective analysis show true 
compassion for our fellow human beings by making the most ef-
fective use of the limited resources available to society. 7 
Discounting 
A regulatory action has an impact not only in the present but 
also in the future. It is necessary, therefore, to place a lower value 
on future costs and benefits than on present costs and benefits. The 
basic notion here is that a given benefit is worth more today than 
tomorrow, and a given cost is less burdensome if borne tomorrow 
than today. (This is a restaten1ent of the economic principle that 
a dollar received today is worth more than a dollar received to-
morrow, because today's dollar could be invested and earn a re-
turn.) For this reason, future benefits and costs have less weight 
than today's benefits and costs. 
This practice is important in evaluating regulatory actions. If 
the costs and benefits of two actions appear equal, and most of the 
benefits of one action occur after five years, while the benefits 
of the other action occur imn1ediately, then the latter is the pre-
ferred alternative. Discounting of the future thus implies that the 
timing of any proposed action's costs and benefits is an important 
consideration in its evaluation. 
Assuming we are able to quantify the costs and benefits in a 
given program, it is then necessary to discount correctly the ben-
7 
efits and costs expected in the future. The discount rate ( r) can 
be crucial, as is seen in the highly simplified, two-period example 
shown in Table 3. 
Table 3 
The Role of Interest Rates 
Benefit Benefit Cost Discounted Benefit in Period I 
Plan Period 1 Period 2 Period 1 r= 10% r=5% 
A $200 0 $100 $200 $200 
B 0 $215 $100 $195 $205 
If all costs accrue in period 1 and the discount rate is 10 per-
cent, then plan A is superior to plan B. However, if the correct 
discount rate is 5 percent, not 10 percent, then plan B is prefer-
able. The appropriate discount rate is obviously very important in 
benefit-cost analysis. Such decisions can be biased, however, if 
Congress or a government agency designates an unrealistically 
low interest rate, which frequently has been the case in federal 
expenditure programs. Such an action tends to underestimate the 
costs of initial capital outlays and overestimate the extent of future 
benefits. 
Uses and Limitations of Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Reliable measures of costs and benefits are not easily achieved 
or always possible. Should the loss of a forest be measured by the 
value of the timber eliminated? What of the beauty destroyed? 
What of the area's value as a wildlife habitat? In view of such 
questions, it is unlikely that agency decision makers will be faced 
with simple choices. 
However, the difficulties involved in estimating the benefits or 
costs of regulatory actions need not serve as a deterrent to pur-
suing the analysis. Merely identifying some of the important and 
often overlooked impacts may be useful in the decision-making 
process. Examples on the cost side include the beneficial drugs 
that are not available because of regulatory obstacles, the freight 
not carried because empty trucks are not permitted to carry back-
hauls, and the television stations that are not broadcasting because 
they were not licensed. On the benefit side, examples include a 
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more productive work force that results from a lower rate of acci-
dents on the job, savings in medical care because of safer products, 
and a healthier environment that results from compliance with 
governmental regulations. 
At times the imperfections of benefit-cost analysis may seem sub-
stantial. Nevertheless, this analysis can add some objectivity to the 
government's decision-making process. While benefit-cost analysis 
is capable only of showing the effectiveness of an action, the sub-
sequent decisions of elected officials and their appointees might 
be envisioned as representing society's evaluations of the equity 
effects of that action. Economists can provide benefit-cost analyses 
and studies of 'the distribution of those benefits and costs, leaving 
the final decision to society's representatives. Presumably, those 
individuals are better able to make political decisions on the im-
pacts of the actions they contemplate. Despite its shortcomings, 
benefit-cost analysis is a neutral concept, giving equal weight to 
a dollar of benefits and to a dollar of costs. 
Not all the criticism of benefit-cost analysis may be valid. The 
idea of attempting to quantify the effects of regulation outrages 
some persons. They forget the objectives that economists have in 
developing such measurements. The goal is not to eliminate all 
regulation. As economists of all political persuasions have testi-
fied before a variety of congressional committees, it is not a ques-
tion of being for or against government regulation of business. A 
substantial degree of intervention in private activities is to be ex-
pected in a complex, modern society. 
Critics who are offended by the notion of subjecting regulation 
to a benefit-cost test may unwittingly be exposing the weakness 
of their position: they must be convinced that some of their pet 
rules would flunk the test. After all, showing that a regulatory ac-
tivity generates an excess of benefits is a strong justification for 
continuing it. 
Despite talk of cold systems approaches, economists are deeply 
concerned about people as well as dollar signs. The painful knowl-
edge that resources available to safeguard human lives are limited 
causes economists to become concerned when they see wasteful 
use of those resources because of regulation. 
General Motors, for example, calculates that society spends $700 
million a year to reduce carbon monoxide auto emissions to 15 
grams per mile, thus prolonging 30,000 lives an average of one 
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year, at a cost of $23,000 for each life. To meet the 1981 standard 
of 3.4 grams per mile, the company estimates that it will cost 
$100 million in addition, and prolong 20 lives by one year at an es-
timated cost of $25 million for each life. Hun1an lives are pre-
cious, which is why it is so sad to note another use of that n1oney. 
It has been estimated that the installation of special cardiac-care 
units in ambulances could prevent 24,000 premature deaths each 
year, at an average cost of approximately $200 for each year of 
life.8 Thus spending the $100 million for the special ambulances 
conceivably could save 500,000 lives a year. 
Part of the problem in setting regulatory policy is that at times 
the benefits are more visible than the costs-not necessarily greater, 
but more evident. If the required scrubber for electric utilities re-
sults in cleaner air, we see the benefits. The costs are merely part 
of the higher electric bill we pay. Thus, the cost of regulation takes 
on the characteristics of a hidden sales tax that is paid by the 
consumer. 
A by-product of benefit-cost analyses is the identification of less 
costly ways to achieve society's regulatory objectives. For example, 
detailed estimates of industrial compliance with federal regula-
tions, produced by Arthur Andersen & Company for the Business 
Roundtable, revealed the types of regulations that tend to gen-
erate especially high costs.9 Such information may help govern-
ment policymakers select less costly approaches. (See Table 4. ) 
In the final analysis, however, the political factors in regulatory 
decision making cannot be ignored. Many social regulations in-
volve a transfer of economic resources from a large number of 
people to a small group of beneficiaries. The Occupational Safety 
and Health Act's (OSHA) coke-oven standard, for example, pro-
tects fewer than 30,000 workers, but is paid for by everyone who 
buys a product containing steel. So long as regulators avoid con-
centrating the costs on a small group that could organize political 
counterpressures, costly regulations can be promulgated easily.10 
Despite the limitations, there is a useful role for formal economic 
analyses of regulatory impacts in providing, at least, an ancillary 
guide to policymakers. As a federal court stated in striking down 
OSHA's proposed benzene regulation: "Although the agency does 
not have to conduct an elaborate cost-benefit analysis, ... it does 
have to determine whether the benefits expected from the stan-
dards bear a reasonable relationship to the costs imposed by the 
IO 
Table 4 
Attributes of Regulations with High Incremental Cost 
Type of Regulation 
Continuous Monitoring 




Specified Compliance Action 
Inadequate Risk Assessment 
Changing Requirements 
Characteristics 
Requires evidence of compliance by means 
of round-the-clock monitoring devices or 
continuous maintenance of comprehensive 
records of actions taken and results 
achieved. 
Requirement to meet a level of compliance 
not achievable with available technology, 
often effected through legislation specifying 
a stringent deadline. 
Requires the purchase of new equipment or 
modification of existing equipment. 
Requires actions that lead to continuing 
costs of operation or maintenance. 
Requires modification of existing facilities, 
not just application to new facilities. 
Requires a specified method of compliance 
without flexibility to recognize differing 
circumstances for application of alternative 
techniques to achieve the desired objective. 
Requires compliance with a stringent stan-
dard even though the risks have not been 
adequately assessed. 
Requires adaptation to rules that are fre-
quently changed or are subject to delay in 
being defined; capital-spending plans are 
made without knowledge of requirements 
to be met. 
Source: Arthur Andersen & Company. 
standard."11 That court's common-sense approach might be the 
direction to which the public policy debates on regulation could 
profitably shift. 
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